Using U.S. cross-sectional data, this paper calculates the welfare cost of a 10% ination for dierent individuals and nds that the dierence in cost between the poorest 10%, measured by their expenditure share on cash goods, and the richest 10% is in the order of 176%. That is, a poor person is on average willing to forgive 176% more of their total consumption in order to have ination reduced from 10% to 0. In absolute terms this represents a cost of 2.687% of consumption for the poorest and 0.974% for the richest. I accomplish this by introducing preference heterogeneity in a monetary search model rst developed by Lagos and Wright (2005) , and calibrate the model to match the expenditure share on cash goods and total expenditures for each individual type using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) for the second quarter of 1996. I also show that this welfare dierence increases to 210% (10.522% for the poorest 10% and 3.401% for the richest 10%) whenever frictions in the use of money are imposed (holdup problem). The ability to explicitly model these frictions is the advantage of using this model. Hence, ination in this framework, as other studies have shown, acts as a regressive consumption tax; and this regressiveness is augmented with the holdup problem.
Introduction
The topic of welfare cost of ination has been extensively studied in economics. The idea that holding money has an opportunity cost given by some interest forgone was rst introduced by Bailey (1956) . Bailey gave the metric for which one could derive how much ination reduces welfare by calculating the area under an inverse money demand curve between some positive interest rate and zero. This area, known as Bailey's triangle, measures the ineciency of carrying money whenever nominal interest rates are positive. Using Bailey's metric, Fischer (1981) , Lucas (1981) , and Lucas (2000) calculated very small welfare costs of ination for the U.S. ranging from 0.3% to 1% of income.
In these models, a maintained assumption is that markets are competitive. This is also true in Cooley and Hansen (1989) and (1991) , where, in both cases, the welfare costs of ination are less than 1%. In general, under competitive markets, most studies have concluded that moderate ination is somewhat costless. Wu and Zhang (2000) deviated from competitive markets and have derived much larger welfare costs; in their paper markets are monopolistically competitive. Lagos and Wright (2005) also deviate from competitive markets by calculating the welfare cost of ination using a simple model of deep money with bilateral trading and transactional demand for cash, where bargaining frictions are explicitly imposed. In their paper, whenever bargaining power is shifted towards the seller (holdup problem), moderate ination creates a much larger cost. Hence, deviations from standard real business cycle models can generate higher welfare costs of ination. The importance of their work is that welfare costs of ination can be calculated in a model with microfoundations and no ex-ante assumptions about the use of cash; which diers from cash in advance or money in the utility function models (reduced form models).
Most of the literature, however, have ignored the possible distributional eects of ination. Easterly and Fischer (2001) , using pooled household data on 38 countries have shown that ination can hurt the poor more than the rich. This result suggests that ination can act as a regressive tax. Erosa and Ventura (2002) , using U.S. household data, calibrate a monetary growth model and show that ination acts as a regressive consumption tax.
The current paper extends the work by Lagos and Wright 1 (2005) by introducing preference heterogeneity similarly to Bhattacharya, Haslag, and Martin (2005) and calculates the welfare cost of a 10% ination for each individual type. I calibrate the model to U.S. household cross-sectional data, using the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) for the second quarter of 1996. As with many models with heterogeneous agents tractability becomes a problem, hence, in order to solve the model explicitly and obtain results, I have made some simplifying assumptions about the agent's type distribution.
There are only 10 types of agents grouped by expenditure shares on cash goods.
Each group has the same number of agents and represents the 10 dierent deciles in the expenditure share distribution. Therefore, as we move from agent type 1 to type 10, the average expenditure share on cash goods increases; and since expenditure share on cash goods is negatively correlated with income, I will assume that as agent type increases, the poorer is the individual.
The main ndings for the baseline model, where no holdup (θ = 1) and sure probability of a single coincidence meeting (σ = 0.5) are assumed, are a welfare cost to range between 0.974%, for agent type 1, and 2.687% for agent type 10. This result shows, in line with other studies, that ination acts as a regressive tax on consumption. When I include the holdup problem (θ = 0.5), the welfare cost increases, as in LW(2005) , to range between 3.401% and 10.522% for those same individuals mentioned above. In relative terms this represents a welfare cost of ination 176% higher for the poorest individuals using the baseline model, and 210% whenever the holdup is imposed.
The facts that the holdup eect increases welfare cost and that ination acts as a regressive consumption tax are not new in the literature. The contribution of this paper is that it combines these two results in a deep model of money. Also, it shows that the regressiveness of the ination tax is augmented in the presence of the holdup problem.
In order to obtain my results, I had to use the data and assume which goods were most likely purchased with cash; hence the basket of cash goods used in this paper was: food consumed at and away from home, alcoholic beverages, apparel, gas and motor oil, prescription drugs, fees and admissions to entertainment events, tobacco and smoking supplies, personal care items, and cash contributions. This assumption makes the aggregate expenditure share on cash goods equal to 0.32, which is larger than the 1 The remaining of this paper will refer to Lagos and Wright (2005) Support to the assumption of cash goods consumption can be found on Avery et al. (1987) , Kennickell et al. (1997) , and Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2000) , where they conclude that a somewhat large fraction of households do not own a checking account or do not have credit cards. According to Evans and Schmalensee (2005) , less than 25% of all consumer expenditures were purchased with credit; this number decreases to less than 15% for the data period studied in this paper. Hence, having individuals interact in a market where only cash is accepted does not constitute a bad assumption here.
The remainder of the paper will be organized in the following matter: rst, I will present the model with its set up, interior equilibrium, and solution; second, the model will discuss the data used for calibration, which is the third part; fourth, results will be presented; and the last part will bring the concluding remarks.
The Model
This model is a variation of the model in LW(2005) extended by Bhattacharya, Haslag and Martin (2005) . Here, agents are allowed to dier with respect to the degree to which they prefer one good over another. As in LW(2005) there will be two types of goods; the day good or cash good and the night good or general good.
Set Up
Time is discrete with each period divided into 2 subperiods. As a convention these subperiods will be called day and night. There are I types of innitely lived agents with each type i having mass χ i , where I i χ i = 1, and discount factor β ∈ (0, 1).
Each agent type consumes and supplies labor in both subperiods. Let x i and h i be the consumption and labor in the day, and X i and H i be the consumption and labor in the night for type i agent. Let γ i be the preference heterogeneity parameter for type i agent 2 . Preferences will be given by:
Where γ i ∈ (0, 1), κ > 0 and u, c, U are twice continuously dierentiable with
The day market is decentralized with anonymous bilateral matching which gives no scope for IOUs, making money, therefore, essential. Let α be the probability of a meeting. The good x comes in many varieties with each agent only consuming a subset of it. Let's assume that every agent can transform h into x one to one and that every agent does not consume what produces.
For two agents i and j meeting in the day market, there are only four possible outcomes that can be divided into three types of meetings with three dierent probabilities.
First, they are both carrying what each other wants with probability δ, this is called a double coincidence meeting and δ is the double coincidence probability. Second, agent
i is carrying what agent j wants but not vice versa; this is called a single coincidence meeting and let σ be the probability for this type of meeting. Symmetrically, σ will also be the probability for the single coincidence case in which j is carrying what i wants but not vice versa. Third, it is possible that both agents meet but neither wants what each other has. This is the case of a no coincidence meeting and the probability of this event happening is (1 − 2σ − δ).
2 Note that γ i enters the utility function in both day and night markets with opposing eects. This is done as to enable the model to match total expenditure data.
The night market is a centralized Walrasian market where agents transform H into X one to one and X varies across individual types. In both night and day markets, goods are perfectly divisible and nonstorable. The only feasible trades in this economy are barter and the exchange of x for money (m) during the day, and the exchange of X for money (m) at night, however, this will only happen if an agent wants to consume more than what it has produced.
One of the important features of the night market is that it resets money holdings for every agent type. Hence, each agent i enters the day market holding m i , where m i is perfectly divisible and storable in any quantity m i ≥ 0. However, given the type of meeting occurred in the day market, agents of the same type may enter the night market holding dierent amounts of money. The supply of money M evolves according to M t = (1 + ρ)M t−1 , where the government changes the money supply with lump-sum transfers or taxes τ on individuals at the beginning of the night market. Therefore, at time t, τ = ρM t−1 .
Equilibrium
Before formally dening the equilibrium in this model, one needs to characterize both the day and night markets as well as the terms of trade for single and double coincidence meetings in the day market. Let F t (m) and G t (m) be the unconditional measures of money holdings m at time t in the day and night markets respectively. And let F it (m i ) and G it (m i ) be the conditional measures of money holdings m i of agent type i at time t in the day and night markets respectively. That is, these distributions measures the agent's starting money holdings at the beginning of period t (day or night) where m ≤m for the unconditional distributions and m i ≤m i for the conditional distributions. Also, let F i0 and G i0 be given exogenously for all i.
Total money holdings in this economy is just the sum of all agents money holdings and since each period is divided into two, the total amount of money carried from one subperiod to the other has to be the same. However, the amount of money held by each type of agent can change from one subperiod to the other, that is, in this model money can be transferred from one type of agent to another in the same period.
One important characteristic of this model is that one can show, under certain conditions, that all the conditional distributions of money holdings must be degenerate in equilibrium. This feature is what guarantees the model's tractability. Also, at the beginning of each subperiod, F it and G it are assumed to be given by the individual type i. This implies that individual decisions only depend on money holdings m i . Let V it (m i ) and W it (m i ) be the individuals value functions holding m i in both day and night markets respectively. Let φ t be the price of money in the night market, that is, 1/φ t is the nominal price of the night good.
Since we have bilateral trading, x i = h i = q it (m j ,m) where q it is the common value for a trade with d jt (m j ,m) being the amount of dollars the buyer pays to obtain q it .
In the expression above, m j is total money holdings of the buyer, whilem is total money holdings of the seller. In double coincidence meetings, let B it (m i ,m) be the payo for an agent holding m i who meets someone withm, that is,
The value function of agent type i beginning the day market at t is given by:
where the rst term represents a single coincidence meeting with the agent being a buyer, that is, it receives utility γ i u(q i ) but only takes m i − d i to the night market. The second term is also a single coincidence meeting with the agent being a seller. There, it costs −c(q i ) to produce the good, but the agent is richer at night with m i + d j . The last two terms are the expected payos from bartering and not trading.
In the night market, the value function of agent type i at time t is:
HereH represents an upper bound on possible hours worked. Even though the corner solution is possible here, I will follow Lagos and Wright's (2005) approach and assume that X * and H * are interior. Lagos and Wright have shown that 0 < H * <H will be satised in these models under standard conditions.
The terms of trade in this model can be characterized in the following way. In the day market, agent i will choose the optimal d i and q i to solve the generalized Nash bargaining problem given by:
with d i ≤ m i and q i ≥ 0, θ > 0 being the buyer's bargaining power parameter, and threat points W it (m i ).
For double coincidence meetings, agents will solve a simple symmetric Nash bargaining problem with threat points given by the continuation values W it (m i ). That is, the agents will need to solve:
subject to −m 2 ≤ Υ ≤ m 1 , where Υ is the amount of money agent 1 pays agent 2, and q i is the quantity consumed by agent i.
Hence, an equilibrium in this model can be the dened as follows:
where for all i and t, V it (m i ) and W it (m i ) are the value functions;
and m it (m i ) are decision rules in the night market; q it (m i ,m) and d it (m i ,m) are the terms of trade in the day market; φ t is the price of money in the night market; and F it and G it are the conditional distributions of money holdings in the beginning of each subperiod. This leads to the following equilibrium conditions for all t:
1. Given φ t , and the conditional distributions F and G; V it (m i ) and W it (m i ) satisfy (2) and (3).
2. q it (m i ,m) and d it (m i ,m) maximize (5) in the day market.
3. φ t > 0, which guarantees a monetary equilibria.
Night money market clears, that is,
that the goods market also clears.
5. {F it , G it } are consistent with the initial conditions and evolution of money holdings from both day and night markets.
Solving the Model
In this part, I will present the general solution to the model without assuming most parameter values or functional forms. In order to simplify the solution to this model without loosing its' generality, let's assume that there are no double coincidence meetings, that is, δ = 0. The approach to solve the model will follow the same steps as in Bhattacharya, Haslag and Martin (2005) .
Starting with the centralized market, for each agent i, we can solve equation 4 for H i and substitute it into equation 3 to obtain,
The rst order conditions with respect to X i and m i are given by, 
in order to completely solve the model one needs to assume some distribution of money holdings across agents.
The price of money φ t can be obtained from the money market clearing condition.
Also notice that the choice of m i is independent of m i , which suggests that the dis- 
Lagos and Wright (2005) have shown that the only feasible equilibrium is when d i = m i and the solution for q i can be obtained from the following rst order condition:
, we have therefore that
Note that the solution to the terms of trade problem only depends on the buyer's money holdings and not the seller's.
Now we can combine what we know about the terms of trade solution and W i (m i )
and rewrite the value function in the decentralized market as:
assuming no double coincidence meetings. Dierentiating the above expression with respect to m i noting that W it (m i ) = φ t for all m i , we obtain
The above expression only depends on the buyer's money holdings and type. From the terms of trade problem we have that d it (m i ) = 1 and
by implicit dierentiation. Substituting these expressions into equation 14 and using equation 12 we obtain the following expression:
In steady state this expression reduces to:
where q i is constant and φ t = (1 + ρ)φ t+1 . We can further simplify equation 17 by dening β ≡
1+r
and dening a nominal interest rate (1+R) as (1+R) = (1+r)(1+ρ), hence equation 17 becomes,
In order to explicitly solve this model, I will assume, following LW (2005), that
for any agent type. This utility form guarantees that u(0) = 0;
where b was chosen to be a very small number making no change in the model's solution.
I will also assume that c(q) = q and U (X) = lnX for every type.
Data
The data used for calibration purposes in this paper was taken from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) for the second quarter of 1996; the data set consists of 3447 observations. Since this data set brings individual expenditure and income information, I will use some of it's features to calibrate γ i and κ for dierent agent types. For the purposes of tractability, I will assume that there are 10 types of agents in this model.
They will dier with respect to their expenditure shares on cash goods, that is, each agent type corresponds to a dierent cohort in the expenditure share distribution.
In order to dene which agent belongs to which cohort, I separated each cohort by expenditure shares on cash goods deciles. This assumption forces each cohort to have the same number of individuals. That is, the rst cohort will constitute of all agents in the bottom 10% of the expenditure share distribution; cohort 2 will constitute of agents between the 10th and 20th percentile in the expenditure share distribution, all subsequent cohorts will follow the same pattern making the last cohort of all agents between the 90th and 100th percentiles. My model will be calibrated to match the median expenditure share on cash goods of each cohort.
In order to achieve this, I need to assume the type of goods that can be considered cash goods. The list of chosen goods was given by: food consumed at and away from home, alcoholic beverages, apparel, gas and motor oil, prescription drugs, fees and admissions to entertainment events, tobacco and smoking supplies, personal care items, and cash contributions. These are the goods that agents consume in the day market.
Let ES D i be the median expenditure share on cash goods across agent type i found in the data, that is, ES D i is the agent located at the 50th percentile expenditure share within each cohort. The use of the median as my measure of center is to guarantee that the measure of the expenditure share on cash goods by each cohort will not be sensitive to any particular observation. However, the use of the average expenditure share would not change the results for this particular data set. Table 1 has the average and median expenditure shares by cohort; one can verify that both measures are very similar across every cohort. Figure 1 shows this relationship.
The reason why this model will be calibrated to also match total expenditure is because the data suggests that total expenditure and income are correlated. The following section will explain the methodology I used to calibrate the model's parameters in detail.
Calibration
The list of calibrated parameters is given by: ρ, σ, δ, α, θ, β, η, κ and γ i . Table 2 has the calibrated values. The values of α and δ were chosen as to simplify the model. The parameter α equaling 1 implies that every individual i will have a meeting in the day market, that is, the probability of having such meeting is a sure event. The parameter δ was set to 0 to eliminate double coincidence meetings. The value of β = 0.99 was chosen to match most studies that have calibrated this parameter for quarterly data.
The ination rate ρ was calibrated to 0.01, which matches 1996 second quarter ination measured by the percentage change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for all urban consumers on all items. The bargaining parameter θ was set to 1 as to eliminate the holdup problem where each buyer makes a take it or leave it oer in the day market, which maximizes the buyer's bargaining power; and 0.5 to capture the holdup problem.
Two values were chosen when calibrating σ: 0.3 and 0.5. Since σ is the probability of a single coincidence meeting, by setting σ = 0.5, we are maximizing the number of successful meetings in the day market. This corresponds to having always an agreement between parties. However, LW(2005) estimated σ using U.S. aggregate data to be 0.3, therefore, for the purposes of checking the sensibility of the results with respect to this parameter, the value of 0.3 was also used. It is important to notice that a σ value of less than 0.5 indicates more friction in the day market, since individuals might not encounter a successful trade. This could potentially increase the welfare costs of ination. I will use the values of θ = 1 and σ = 0.5 as my baseline model; all other 3 possible combinations of θ and σ will constitute the dierent specications also used. 
for i = 1, 2, ..., 10; where X * i = κ(1 − γ i ). Note that in the equation above q * i (γ i ) is being multiplied by σ. The reason for this is that since σ represents the probability of a successful single coincidence meeting, (1 − σ) is the probability of an unsuccessful meeting, and whenever this happens q * i (γ i ) = 0. In order to solve this system, one needs to nd the solution for q * i as a function of γ i .
T ER
Whenever θ = 1, q * i (γ i ) has a closed form solution, however, for θ < 1, q * i (γ i ) needs to be solved numerically. I have also used numerical methods to solve this system, as none of the equations have closed form solutions 3 . θ and σ, the model performs quite well. The reason why total expenditure ratios did not match the data exactly is that in the minimization procedure, κ did not produce the sum of squared deviations to be exactly zero.
The importance of having the parameter κ in the model is that it guarantees that poorer agent's measured by their total expenditure are the ones with higher expenditure shares on cash goods. The model captures the overall trend in total expenditures on cash goods, regardless of the specication, even though, it does not match the data exactly. However, the model matches the data with respect to the consumption of the general good for all specications. Overall, the model performs well when compared to the data.
Comparing the results from table 4, q * i increases for larger values of σ and θ for all i; this feature is consistent with Lagos and Wright (2004) , where they have shown that ∂q ∂θ > 0 and ∂q ∂σ > 0. It is quite trivial to check that these eects are also true in my model. In the case of the bargaining parameter θ, the smaller it becomes the smaller is the buyer's bargaining power, which results in a smaller surplus, decreasing the buyer's incentive to purchase that good. The parameter σ is the probability of a single coincidence meeting, the smaller it becomes the harder it is to accomplish a successful match. Hence, lower σ values should result in lower consumption of cash goods. Since both of these parameters impose more frictions in the market for cash goods and since their eect on q * i is qualitatively the same, the consumption of cash good will be the lowest whenever more frictions are imposed at the same time, that is, θ = 0.5 and σ = 0.3. In order to capture which friction aects q * the most, we can compare the solutions to q * i for two dierent combinations of the parameters θ and σ: θ = 1, σ = 0.3, and θ = 0.5, σ = 0.5. The rst combination imposes a larger friction on nding a bargaining partner and no friction in the terms of trade; once a partner has been found, the buyer has all the bargaining power and makes a take-it or leave-it oer to the seller. The second combination imposes the minimum friction on nding a partner, but creates a friction on the bargaining for the buyer. With θ = 0.5, the seller is able to bargain some of the surplus way from the buyer, reducing the buyer's incentive to bring cash to the market. The solution to q * i is smaller whenever the bargaining friction is imposed for all i compared to the solution where the meeting friction is imposed. In fact, q * i is in general smaller for smaller values of θ regardless of the value assigned to σ. This result suggests that the holdup eect is stronger relative to the single coincidence meeting probability.
Another interesting feature of the solution is the relationship between X * i , H * i , and money holdings across agents. For any agent i, whenever X * i > H * i implies that actual money holdings are smaller than average money holdings for the average type i agent, for given φ, σ, and ρ. This result can be derived from the agent's budget constraint in the night market. Also, since the agent is consuming more than it produces, it has to use cash to purchase what is left, hence it uses some of the government transfer to accomplish that. This implies that these agents take less than m+τ to the decentralized market. The opposite is true for the case where X * i < H * i . Hence q * i should increase as H * i becomes larger than X * i . Table 4 shows that agent types 1, 2, 3, and 4 work less than the amount they consume in the centralized market; this situation is reversed for agents type 5 through 10. Also, the dierence between H * i and X * i increases as we move from agent 1 to agent 10, that is, H * 10 − X * 10 > H * 9 − X * 9 > ... > H * 1 − X * 1 . This explains why q * i increases with agent type.
Welfare Cost of Ination
In this section, the solution to the model will be analyzed with respect to the agent's welfare as we change the ination rate. Since agent's i utility form is quasi-linear, the welfare cost of ination calculation becomes quite simple, since consumer surplus can just be measured as the dierence in welfare functions when reducing ination from x% to zero. That is, let Y * i be the steady state welfare function of agent i. Then Y * i can be written as,
for any ination rate ρ.
Letting ∆ be the fraction of consumption that agent i is willing to forgive in order to maintain the same level of welfare and reduce ination from some positive value to zero, we have:
The welfare cost of ination will be the value 1 − ∆ obtained from subtracting equation (22) from (21) and setting the dierence equal to zero. Table 5 brings the results in percentage form. Column 1 has the results for the baseline model. Each number on the table corresponds to the percentage amount of consumption forgone that a consumer would allow in order to have ination reduced from 10% to zero. Figure 9 plots the results from table 5 for every specication as to make the visualization better.
Note that for the baseline model, the welfare cost of ination ranges between 0.974% and 2.687% and is monotonically increasing. This implies that the poorest 10% can suer 2.76 times more than the richest 10%. Without a doubt, the regressiveness of the ination tax is present in this model. Table 5 also shows that the holdup problem acts as a magnier with respect to the welfare cost of ination. As in LW (2005), by introducing the holdup problem, the welfare cost of ination is larger given any agent type. Since in this paper agents dier with respect to their total expenditures, it is reasonable to ask if the holdup eect also varies with agent type, that is, is the holdup eect dierent for dierent individuals?
The answer is: most certainly. Figure 10 plots the dierence in welfare cost of ination, obtained in from table 5, for each agent type between holdup and no holdup. In both cases, regardless of the value of σ, one can detect an increasing relationship. That is, the holdup eect is stronger for individuals who spend a larger percentage of their earnings on cash goods.
The model suggests that while the holdup eect is in the order of 3 percentages points for agent type 1, this eect increases to 8 or 11 percentage points, depending on σ, for agent type 10. This result suggests that the holdup eect increases the regressiveness of the ination tax.
As to make the welfare cost results more tractable, table 6 has the solution to the dierence between equations 22 and 21 piece by piece. This table shows that the driving force behind the dierences in welfare costs is the dierence between the consumption of cash goods and therefore the dierence in utility between them. As the dierence in utilities increase, more needs to be taken away from consumption whenever ination is zero in order to have the equation hold; that is, as the dierence in utility increases ∆ decreases. Note that the largest dierence in utilities can be found for the case where θ = 0.5 and σ = 0.3. This has to be true since the utility function is concave, and optimal q decreases with lower values of θ and σ. Hence, the curvature of the utility function should matter for the welfare calculations. Figures 11 and 12 has welfare cost results for dierent η values; recall that η measures the degree of risk averseness.
In all cases the results remain the same with small changes in welfare costs for given agent types. It appears, therefore, that the results are not sensible to η values in the neighborhood of 0.25.
One last remark on table 6 is that the dierences in hours worked at night are similar across agents, however, it is negative for agents 1 to 4, and positive otherwise. Overall, this dierence is increasing on agent type. That is, ination creates an disincentive to work on poorer individuals.
Since this model uses household data to establish a distribution of agent types and calculates welfare cost of ination for each type, comparing these results to other studies is quite dicult. However, it is possible to aggregate my results given the assumed distribution of agents and calculate the welfare cost of ination for this average individual. Table 7 Table 8 and gure 14 presents these results. It is quite noticeable that even though the results dier in absolute terms, the relativity of them was preserved. This is very important, since no one knows exactly which goods are purchased with cash,and therefore any welfare cost calculation will be inuenced by this assumption, however, this paper shows that regardless of your choice, it is possible to assess the cost in relative terms.
Conclusion
This paper calibrated a simple monetary search model to U.S. household expenditure data and calculated the welfare cost of 10% ination for dierent individual types grouped by expenditure share on cash goods deciles. These individuals varied with re-spect to the degree they preferred cash goods over the general good. The main ndings of this exercise, in line with other studies, were that: rst, ination acts as a regressive consumption tax since individuals with smaller total expenditure and therefore less earnings suer more with ination than individuals with higher total expenditure.
Second, the introduction of the holdup problem generates higher relative welfare costs, augmenting; therefore, the regressiveness of the ination tax.
The main contribution of this paper was to combine two known results from the literature -ination is regressive and holdup increases it's cost -in a deep, but simple, model of money with micro foundations. The simplicity of this model makes it useful for applications to dierent data sets as well as dierent countries.
Hence, some interesting extensions to this work would be to apply this model to developing countries who have experienced periods of large ination. In these countries, poorer individuals use cash for almost every purchase with very little bargaining power; hence ination could potentially be relatively more harmful to these individuals compared to the wealthier. Also, one could introduce a competing media of exchange in the model in the form of a credit good, where only a fraction of the population have access to it at some cost. This good would protect individuals against ination, making it's cost smaller relative to the fraction of the population that does not have access to credit. This scenario is probably applicable to most countries in the world, but specially poorer countries with high degrees of inequality.
Lastly, one could introduce heterogeneity in the labor productivity in the centralized market together with preference heterogeneity. This feature could match the results from this paper, however, it would provide us with better insights with respect to labor decisions under ination. The current paper displays dierent labor choices as ination changes, however, workers are paid the same, which might not be the best assumption, since dierences in wage rates could potentially provide some explanation, other than preferences, for how much people decide to work. 
